Proponents of Tor recommend reading renowned security expert Bruce Schneier's article on the value of privacy. Schneier makes a compelling argument in favour of the value of privacy. But use of Tor isn't just about privacy.
There are, fundamentally, two forms of freedom. There is the freedom "to," and the freedom "from." There is also the balance of freedoms: how one person's freedoms affect another's. Services like Tor address both the freedom "to" and the freedom "from," but deprive others of both freedom "to" and freedom "from."
Tor works by routing a user's Internet connection through a long and wholly undocumented and unlogged list of participating hosts. Theoretically, it is impossible to trace a connection back to its origin through this system. With the lack of logging, the only practical way is to monitor participating hosts and try and figure out who is doing what. The result is that anyone who uses Tor is anonymous to anyone whose services he is using. This provides the Tor user the freedom to privacy, and complete freedom from being identified.
This also takes away service providers' freedom to monitor access, and the freedom from abuse.
Bruce Schneier's argument, as twisted by Tor users, would appear to be that it is not a provider's right to know who is using its services. Tor users worry that providers are in a position of power, and power corrupts. The logic employed -- that if a provider knows who is using its services it will use that information for nefarious purposes -- is no more sensible than assuming that someone who is using a privacy service like Tor is necessarily doing so to facilitate trouble-making.
My fundamental problem with Tor is connected to my experience as an IRC operator. On IRC networks, Tor prevents freedom from abuse. If a hundred people use Tor, and one of them abuses his privileges on a provider's network, the only alternative for a provider (other than allowing the abuse to continue) is to block all 100 users, because there is no way to differentiate among them. Because blocking large groups of users often is not a practical solution, that one problematic user can continue being a problem without any limitations.
Privacy vs. freedom
Schneier states that the debate is wrongfully categorised as a debate between privacy and security. I agree -- it is not privacy versus security, it is privacy versus freedom. When one person's privacy restricts someone else's freedom, we have a problem.
In the real world, every country has a legal system with a set of rules by which everyone must live. If someone breaks one of those rules, a police force and judicial system exists to prevent them from continuing to do so. In some cases, the rules are unjust, but generally, rules are designed to protect the freedoms of others. Take the police force and judicial system out of the equation, and you end up with anarchy.
That's what Tor brings to the Internet. If everyone on the Internet used Tor, and no one could figure out where anyone was coming from anymore, the Internet would be a complete anarchy, even though most people would still attempt to continue their normal, honest behavior.
While IP-address-based restrictions may not be an ideal solution for managing services on the Internet, it is the best currently available. Tor in effect removes this system from the Internet.
Prior to Tor, similar problems existed through open proxies and hacked accounts, but these can be blocked, because there is no such thing as a legitimate user coming through these means.
Please understand, I'm not against the concept of privacy. What I am against is the concept of total anonymity. I would not object to Tor, or any other anonymising service, if it provided a way of uniquely identifying users. I don't care if connections can be traced back to actual end users, just that they can be managed separately. But making end users identifiable is contrary to the stated objectives of Tor.
Are there practical solutions? Yes. The simplest solution would be to require registration of Tor users, and have service providers implement a system to check users' registration status. Though it wouldn't eliminate problems, it could reduce them and make them more manageable. Unfortunately, it would remove the very anonymity Tor seeks to create.
Is there a way to balance the privacy of users with the propensity for bad apples to destroy the crop? If so, what is it?
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There seems to be no shortage nowadays of people willing to explain at tedious length why it is perfectly OK for the government to take away our freedoms. Usually, they just trot out the old "if you've done nothing wrong, you have nothing to hide" mantra - crude, but effective, because it can be conveyed in less than 10 seconds, whereas the rebuttal requires reasoned explanation. In a country with high schools that don't teach people how to think, that's a winning strategy.
This article's attack on freedom is a little more subtle. The essence is this:
In other words, he wants to be able to use his power as an IRC operator to block people whom he decides are "abusing" the facility. He's not concerned about anyone's freedom, he's concerned about the operator's loss of power.
The obvious problem with that argument is that he really doesn't have the power even without Tor. Most internet users have dynamic IP addresses from their ISP anyway. Sure, if the abuse is really bad, he may be able to get the ISP to terminate the user's account, but I doubt that is easy.
The other problem with the argument is that by operating a slightly different kind of service, he can achieve "freedom from abuse" anyway. There are IRC communities that want the operator to be able to block abusive people, and who share the operator's standards. They can still have that. All it takes is a "login" requirement - a username and password, given only to users who supply a verifiable email address within the domain of their ISP.
I'd replace that last sentence by:
The Bill of Rights tried to protect the freedoms "We the People" used to have.
On IRC networks, Tor prevents freedom from abuse. If a hundred people use Tor, and one of them abuses his privileges on a provider's network, the only alternative for a provider (other than allowing the abuse to continue) is to block all 100 users, because there is no way to differentiate among them. Because blocking large groups of users often is not a practical solution, that one problematic user can continue being a problem without any limitations.
Let me get this straight. You're running a publicly-hosted service without any built-in authentication/authorization, with lame workarounds to that problem. Now you're complaining that some other piece of software is screwing up the workarounds. How about, gosh, using a real messaging service? Like, say, maybe, Jabber?
This also takes away service providers' freedom to monitor access, and the freedom from abuse.
Only if the services the providers are providing rely upon IP addresses for said freedoms. Real ones don't. Lame ones do. It's your choice as a service provider.
If everyone on the Internet used Tor, and no one could figure out where anyone was coming from anymore, the Internet would be a complete anarchy...
Stop relying upon IP address as an identifier. Then, Tor poses no real problem. IP address isn't a good identifier, anyway, due to proxies, particularly the round-robin variety (see: AOL).
While IP-address-based restrictions may not be an ideal solution for managing services on the Internet, it is the best currently available.
Gee, I guess we need to develop something where a user...oh, I don't know...maybe has to use some sort of secret phrase in order to access a service, based upon a prior registration. Let's call it a "password" after the old game show. Betcha nobody's thought of that idea before!
Oh, wait...
The simplest solution would be to require registration of Tor users, and have service providers implement a system to check users' registration status. Though it wouldn't eliminate problems, it could reduce them and make them more manageable. Unfortunately, it would remove the very anonymity Tor seeks to create.
Not really. Or, more to the point, it doesn't change anything. Face facts: there is no absolute means of identification online. Witness the whole MySpace "what age is the user" problem that's making the rounds in the mass media. Tor creates anonymity for casual Internet use. Some service providers don't care about your freedoms, and hence Tor provides "complete" anonymity to them. If you are a service provider who does care, you can choose to do authentication/authorization; in this case, Tor users have their choice of supplying real or fake registration information. In the end, the service provider only has a statistical probability of having identifying information for any given user. Tor doesn't change that; it only changes the tactics used on both sides.
If I want 'plausible deniability', I won't.
I'm a free man. I hold myself accountable for my actions. I accept that I won't live forever. I understand some of the laws of my country, probably not all of them, and I do my best to obey.
But that's as far as it goes. I don't want a bureaucratic layer trying to track me. Or trying to track anyone else.
Why do people continue to try and do things on the 'Net that can't be done in a stateless environment? Even cookies and all the other workarounds won't make it anything less. If you want a dedicated connection with direct state connections then build it. But the 'Net isn't it. AJAX and the other similar tech just make it seem like there's a persistent connection. But it's not. It will never be as long as it's based on TCP/IP. The Internet is supposed to be stateless and must continue to remain so. Tor is nothing more than what the Internet is designed to be.
This also takes away service providers' freedom to monitor access, and the freedom from abuse.
The article writer lost my sympathy completely with this early gambit in his argument.
It was Ben Franklin. The only President of the United States who was never President of the United States.
I will argue that service providers should not, and might not, have the right to monitor access.
AT&T is your service provider. They have no inherent right to listen in on your conversations. Same with the US postal service: they have no right to snoop through your mail. The government can, if they get a warrent (I'll skirt the debate on the legality of warrentless domestic spying), but Americans are, in every communications medium beside the Internet, granted the right to privacy, and this right protects them also from the service providers.
--- SER
Identify users (ie on IRC)
Posted by: Anonymous Coward on June 24, 2006 04:33 PM#