chief technology officer of Cylant
Each year more money is spent on information systems security, and each
year there are more incidents, more losses, and greater average losses.
Security spending, vulnerabilities, attacks, and related losses were at
record highs in 2001. This year is expected to be worse.
It should be obvious that the data security industry is missing
something critical when it comes to reigning in the losses caused by
security incidents. The potential for hundreds of thousands of systems
to be compromised literally overnight is a systemic failure that must be
The increased reliance on the Internet and other networked systems makes
developing a real and workable preventive solution for computer security
an economic necessity. A security process that can keep systems secure
in spite of their vulnerabilities is becoming a necessity. The current
vulnerability-driven security process is just not up to the challenge.
Human errors create security holes
It's a basic fact: Mistakes are inevitable. People make mistakes when
they design, write, install, configure, and use software.
The engineers who design mechanical systems assume that defects will
exist and design products accordingly. Software engineers, on the other
hand, seem to assume that the software they produce will be 100 percent
defect free, installed perfectly by customers, and used precisely
according to the manual. In reality, software:
Contains design and implementation defects.
Is often installed incorrectly.
Is used in ways unexpected by the designers.
Is subject to malicious use.
The total number of defects in a given piece of software is unknown.
Some of these defects lie dormant for the entire life of the application
and never become security, reliability, or availability problems. Other
defects are discovered and the security vulnerabilities they cause
immediately become growing sources of risk. Each defect has the potential
to become a problem, but only if the defect is actually encountered.
The recent vulnerabilities with OpenSSH software demonstrate
that even intensive auditing cannot necessarily root out all the defects
from software. As software systems become
larger and more complex, intensive auditing becomes more expensive and
more difficult. Software audits simply cannot be relied upon to find all
of the security vulnerabilities in any given system.
Making the situation worse, unforeseen software usage by legitimate
users and malicious attackers can cause programs to execute through
defects that had previously lain dormant. These unexpected execution
paths are an inconvenience for the innocent user, but a gold mine for
the vulnerability seeker.
The increased usage of network software systems and the rapid
time-to-market schedules demanded by businesses have caused a dramatic
increase in the number of vulnerabilities discovered and security
incidents that occur each year. In just the past two years, these numbers
have doubled, according to CERT. Because it is highly
unlikely that the trend toward inter-networked systems will halt or even
slow, or that the market pressures on software manufacturers will
subside, preventive security has become a must for those who need to
reduce their security risk exposure.
Preventive security techniques
The preventive security techniques discussed in this paper flow from the
following axiom: If you can't or don't control a system, you cannot
secure it. Put simply, security comes from control. Therefore,
preventive security requires giving administrators real control over
computer systems. If the administrator cannot prevent people from
running malicious code or tampering with data, their systems will not be
Preventive security techniques are subject to some a priori limitations
and conditions. The methodologies for preventive security need to meet
the following requirements:
Techniques must prevent attempted breaches from succeeding.
Techniques must be implementable.
Techniques must be manageable.
Techniques should err on the side of caution.
Because the purpose of preventive security is to prevent breaches, that is
naturally a mandatory requirement. This requirement brings with it
certain challenges that have historically been hard to overcome. First,
the technologies we use must be able to spot attempted breaches in real
These breaches must be spotted whether they are a previously known
breach, or a completely new type. Second, these attempts must be stopped
before they succeed. Finally, the technologies must be accurate. False
negatives (failing to spot an attack) and false positives (spotting an
attack where there is none) must not occur or occur very rarely.
Stopping attacks before they are able to succeed requires machine-time
response. It is not feasible to place a human in the response loop
because they simply cannot be relied upon to respond in less than a
second to each and every attempt. Human involvement is for oversight and
fine-tuning automated responses to ensure conformity with the security
Providing this level of protection must not have a substantive impact on
the performance, reliability, and availability of the services being
protected. The techniques chosen or developed must be capable of being
implemented without affecting proper system and service usage.
Further, the protection must be easy to manage. IT departments need to
be able to integrate preventive security management into the standard
network and system administrative tasks. Currently, security
administration is an irregular and unpredictable task relative to normal
administration. This is one of the major reasons security is not kept up
to date -- updates cannot be scheduled because outside entities dictate
the schedule by finding vulnerabilities, attacking systems, and
Preventive security management must be just another routine
administrative task similar to adding a new authorized user to the
authentication system, installing new software, rolling out a new
service, or updating a currently installed software package to get the
Finally, the techniques used should err on the side of caution. Many
security holes exist because people temporarily adopt insecure practices
and then forget to close the holes. Computers are very good at
remembering to do things, and sealing up temporary holes is a good thing
to remember to do. Even better would be having the ability to create
tightly constrained temporary holes that close automatically. The
continual goal should be to prevent attempted security breaches from
Human and technological aspects
Preventive security techniques rely on both human and technological
components. The division of labor needs to reflect the strengths of each.
There are three principal human aspects of preventive security:
authorization, policy creation, and management. Authorization determines
who is allowed to use a given set of resources, as well as the nature of
the allowed usage. Creating a useful security policy is also a uniquely
human task. The security policy must set forth what activity is allowed
and what activity is not allowed. It should do this at a granularity
level that makes the implementation of the policy as decision-free as
possible. The more direct the mapping from the policy to its
implementation, the lower the likelihood for implementation mistakes and
the easier it will be to identify implementation mistakes. The final
human component is the routine management of the technological
components of preventive security.
There are three technological components to preventive security:
authentication, behavioral control, and access control. Each of these
components implements a type of control over the behavior of the system.
Control is the driving principle of preventive security. Authentication
controls system access so that only those persons granted authorization
are allowed in. Behavioral control governs what the authorized and
authenticated users are allowed to do on a system once they are logged
in. Behavioral control constrains execution and system usage behavior so
that it stays within the approved behavior set defined by the security
policy. Access control governs the visibility and mutability of data
resources throughout the system and the network. Access control
constrains the usage of data by the authenticated users of a system in
accordance with the security policy.
By working together, the three technological aspects of preventive
security are able to control and constrain the activity of the system.
For example, the resources (files) used in the authentication process
must be protected. Access control provides this protection. The actual
process of authentication itself is protected by behavioral control,
making sure that the authentication processes execute properly.
Authentication, in turn, controls who can update and change the access
and behavioral control systems.
The assignment of trust and authorization governs the control
implemented by the technological aspects of preventive security. People
define the security policy and decide who the authorized users of the
system are. The technical components provide the mechanisms to enforce
the policy and authorization decisions.
Organized around four activities
The implementation of preventive security breaks down into four
iterative tasks. First, the security policy must be established and kept
up to date. In preventive security, the security policy is meant to be a
meaningful document. It should set forth the precise levels of access
and behavior required for authorized users to perform legitimate tasks.
It should also define the usage to which systems will be constrained.
Instead of sitting on a shelf being pleasantly ignored, the security
policy should be actively enforced and updated as the authorized usage
of the system changes.
Second, decisions must be made about allowing people and systems access
to resources and which resources they will be allowed to access. These
authorization decisions need to be revisited at predictable intervals
such as when people are hired or fired, when their tasks change, when
new outsourcing vendors are chosen, and when new internal or external
services are rolled out.
Behavioral and access control constraints tend to need to be updated
together at predictable intervals: when new applications or services are
deployed, when new versions of applications are deployed, or when an
application's legitimate usage changes. These events correspond with the
events that require updating the detailed security policy. In fact,
successful behavioral and access control techniques should be able to
assist in the creation of a fine-grained security policy by auditing the
accesses and behaviors needed in the course of authorized usage.
The work aspects of preventive security are driven by the activities of
the organization. Preventive security for an organization that is
routinely deploying new software and rolling out new services will
require more work than would be necessary for an organization that does
not deploy new services and software as often. Contrast this with
current approaches to security that are driven by the frequency of
vulnerability discoveries, frequency and type of attacks, and the time
lag for releasing vulnerability patches. One of the main goals of
preventive security is making certain that the relevant events are under
your control, rather than being controlled by external entities of
One of the advantages of this approach is that organizations are able to
accurately predict what their security workload will be at any given
time. Such predictability should make security work boring for security
professionals: No tracking down attackers, studying packet dumps for
attack analysis, or all-night software patch fests. Boring is good for
CEOs and CFOs.
Preventive security presents a different security process. Instead of
being driven by vulnerabilities, preventive security is driven by
legitimate changes in system usage. Because of this, preventive security
techniques can keep systems secure in spite of vulnerabilities. That is
crucial, because as long as people produce software, they will continue
to make mistakes in the process. As the level of interconnectivity
between computers, businesses, clients, customers, and partners grows,
the need for a truly secure computing platform will only increase.
Scott Wimer is chief technology officer of Cylant, a division of
Software Systems International The company is the developer of
CylantSecure, a Linux host-based intrusion detection software product
that takes a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to security. Through behavioral measurement, CylantSecure is able to detect malicious
activity in real time and control the operation of the software to
report and immediately stop any aberrant behavior.
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