Containers Break the Shared Responsibility Model Between Cloud Providers and Ops
Last month, a critical vulnerability in the basic Linux network infrastructure was discovered by Felix Wilhelm from Google’s Security Team and disclosed by Red Hat product security.
The attack exploits a problem in the processing of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) messages, which is the way machines automatically set up their network connectivity. A command injection vulnerability was found in a script included in the DHCP client (dhclient) packages, allowing an attacker to pose as a legitimate DHCP server, sending specially crafted packets containing malicious commands that a DHCP client may unsuspectingly execute. This vulnerability affects Red Hat commercial Enterprise Linux 6 and 7 and the various Linux derivative distros such as Fedora & CentOS.
Taking this vulnerability as an example, we can see how a traditional “shared responsibility” model of security between cloud providers and their customers becomes less effective for containerized workloads. As network plugins have become the standard way of providing networking between containers, cloud providers have not stepped up their own responsibility for securing containers, leaving security and operations teams struggling when patching becomes insufficient to secure their containerized applications.
Read more at The New Stack